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Occupational Mobility and the Business Cycle
*
 
Do workers sort more randomly across different job types when jobs are harder to find? To 
answer this question, we study the mobility of male workers among three-digit occupations in 
the matched files of the monthly Current Population Survey over the 1979-2004 period. We 
clean individual occupational transitions using the algorithm proposed by Moscarini and 
Thomsson (2008). We then construct a synthetic panel comprising annual birth cohorts, and 
we examine the respective roles of three potential determinants of career mobility: individual 
ex ante worker characteristics, both observable and unobservable, labor market prospects, 
and ex post job matching. We provide strong evidence that high unemployment somewhat 
offsets the role of individual worker considerations in the choice of changing career. 
Occupational mobility declines with age, family commitments and education, but when 
unemployment is high these negative effects are weaker, and reversed for college education. 
The cross-sectional dispersion of the monthly series of residuals is strongly countercyclical. 
As predicted by Moscarini (2001)’s frictional Roy model, the sorting of workers across 
occupations is noisier when unemployment is high. As predicted by job-matching theory, 
worker mobility has significant residual persistence over time. Finally, younger cohorts, 
among those in the sample for most of their working lives, exhibit increasingly low 
unexplained career mobility. 
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A major function of labor markets is to allocate people eﬃciently, namely, to ensure that each
worker ﬁnds the right job. Does unemployment make this process noisier? Do workers sort
more randomly when jobs are scarce? In this paper, we precisely formulate these questions
in a theoretical framework, and we present new empirical evidence in favor of a positive
answer.
A prominent tradition in macroeconomics, going back to Schumpeter (1939), empha-
sizes the continuous reallocation of resources across heterogeneous production units as the
“mode” of aggregate business ﬂuctuations and economic growth. If capital is a quasi-ﬁxed
factor, technological progress can only be implemented through the “creative destruction”
of installed capital and the reallocation of labor to new production processes. Recent em-
pirical work on establishment-level and matched employer-employee longitudinal data sets
supports two central tenets of this tradition. Substantial idiosyncratic heterogeneity remains
in the productivities of ﬁrms and workers after conditioning on their observable characteris-
tics (Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999), Mortensen (2003)) and persists through time at
the ﬁrm level (Haltiwanger, Lane and Spletzer (2000)). The reallocation of existing inputs
across establishments explains half of total productivity growth in US manufacturing (see
Haltiwanger (2000) for a survey). Aggregate labor market ﬂows have taken center stage.1
In this paper, we study the reallocation of male workers among Census three-digit oc-
cupations, using micro-data representative of the US population, the monthly matched ﬁles
of the Current Population Survey (CPS) over the 1979-2004 period. Our main goal is to
study the causal eﬀect of cyclical labor market conditions on the process of workers sorting,
in this case, through occupations. We argue, and provide evidence, that high unemployment
weakens the role of individual worker characteristics in the choice of occupations. Thus,
while reallocation is partially determining aggregate ﬂuctuations, there is also an eﬀect in
t h eo p p o s i t ed i r e c t i o n .
The theoretical foundation of our empirical work is Moscarini (2001)’s version of the Roy
model with search and matching frictions. In the equilibrium of that model, when unemploy-
ment rises, and job oﬀers are slower to materialize, workers pay less attention on locating
in the speciﬁc occupations which are best suited to their skills and focus more on remaining
employed. As a consequence, the predictive power of individual worker characteristics for
their occupational mobility should be lower in a depressed labor market. This is, indeed, the
case in our sample, which suggests that the quality of sorting and employment reallocation
1For job turnover see Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996), Davis, Faberman and Haltiwanger (2006)).
For worker turnover, see Murphy and Topel (1987), Blanchard and Diamond (1990), Fallick and Fleischman
(2004), Moscarini and Thomsson (2008).
1is procyclical, although this further implication awaits careful scrutiny.
Our focus on three-digit occupations is motivated by two considerations. First, mobility
at this level of disaggregation has not only an obvious interest for labor economists, who
have investigated career mobility from their own viewpoint, but also for macroeconomists.
In the Schumpeterian perspective, the reallocation of a worker is relevant insofar as it implies
a change in the technology applied to his or her labor services. By deﬁnition, ac h a n g eo fo c -
cupation necessarily entails a change of technology for the worker, while the same conclusion
does not necessarily hold for a change of employer or sector. For example, a secretary may
perform the same tasks for diﬀerent employers in diﬀerent industries. Hence, research on
the creative destruction process should be primarily concerned with occupational mobility.
Indeed, Kambourov and Manovskii (2007) ﬁnd evidence that the bulk of speciﬁch u m a n
capital accumulation occurs at the level of occupation, not of industry or job.
Second, we focus on a much ﬁner degree of disaggregation of occupations, at the three-
digit level, than most of the existing literature, because this degree appears to more closely
correspond to a “career.” In contrast to the few one-digit occupational groups commonly
considered−such as technical and sales, laborers etc.−there exist over 450 three-digit occu-
pations. Important moves at the three-digit level can be easily missed at the one-digit level.
For example, an examination of the Census Occupational codes reveals that the clearly dis-
tinct three-digit categories Architects, Dieticians, and History Teachers are all included in
the same one-digit group “Managerial and Professional Specialty occupations.”2 Since the
raw data on occupational transitions appear to be extremely noisy in the monthly CPS, we
adopt occupational transition data from Moscarini and Thomsson (2008), based on matched
monthly CPS ﬁles and cleaned by an algorithm which crucially exploits the short longitudinal
dimension of the CPS rotating panel.
Our choice of data source and sample period is due to a combination of factors. Ideally,
we would like a long time series to examine the behavior of the mobility measure under
diﬀerent macroeconomic conditions. However, for a microeconomic study of the factors de-
termining mobility one needs a consistent data set comprising the same variables measured
in a consistent manner through time. These considerations lead us to focus on the 1979-2004
CPS monthly ﬁles. In this data set, Moscarini and Thomsson (2008) ﬁnd the pattern illus-
trated in Figure 1. The reallocation of employed men across three-digit occupations averages
about 3.5% per month, is clearly procyclical,3 increases from the late 1970s, peaks in the mid
2Finer classiﬁcations are not available in the CPS data that we employ. In the Standard Occupational
Classiﬁcation, the 3-digit category Architects (e.g.) is divided into such 4-digit categories as Landscape
Architects, Architectural Designers, Supervising Architects, and the like. However, job switches among
these ﬁner 4-digit occupations are not particularly signiﬁcant in terms of skill reallocation, while job changes
among the Census 3-digit categories deﬁnitely are.



























































































Figure 1: Monthly 3—digit Occupational Mobility, Men (from Moscarini and Thomsson (2008))
1990s, then drops, sharply after the 2001 recession.4 We attempt to estimate the respective
contributions of various individual characteristics and aggregate business conditions to the
individual mobility decisions underlying this aggregate pattern.
First, diﬀerent workers have diﬀerent propensities to change careers. We ask whether
the changing composition of the labor force is contributing to the changes in aggregate labor
mobility. A similar issue pertains to possible changes over time in worker unobservable
characteristics, and we describe our strategy for dealing with this below.
Second, worker reallocation can also be impeded by a variety of frictions, such as ad-
deﬁned sectors was procyclical in the 1970’s, with instances of countercyclical churning. Murphy and Topel
(1987) ﬁnd in 1968-1985 CPS data that worker mobility across sectors declined over time and in recessions.
Kambourov and Manovskii (2008) study the time series behavior of occupational mobility in the PSID, for
the period 1968-1997. Taking into account diﬀerences in sample disposition, their ﬁndings on annual mobility
are quantitatively consistent with the monthly series in Figure 1.
4Occupational reclassiﬁcations make the level of mobility across subperiods not directly comparable, as
s h o w ni nF i g u r e1w i t hd i ﬀerent colors by subperiod. There is, however, no evidence of major discontinuities
upon reclassiﬁcations. In previous drafts of this paper, using annual March ﬁles, we also studied Net Reallo-
cation, namely one half of the sum of the absolute changes in occupational employment shares, to measure
the reshuﬄing required to accommodate changes in the distribution of employment across occupations, ig-
noring oﬀsetting moves that cancel out (Murphy and Topel (1987) and Jovanovic and Moﬃtt (1990)). In this
draft we re-focus on data at monthly frequency, ideal for studying turnover, where the cleaning algorithm of
Moscarini and Thomsson (2008) detects genuine occupational transitions and rejects spurious ones, but does
not improve the accuracy of the exact occupation a worker is in. Due to this limitation, we do not compute
Net Reallocation, which requires precise knowledge of the employment shares of the diﬀerent occupations.
3justment costs to labor on the demand side, the cost of retraining displaced workers on the
supply side, search-and-matching frictions on both sides. Then, the state of the labor mar-
ket interferes with worker sorting. Moscarini (2001) spells out this mechanism when workers
sort ex ante across diﬀerent types of jobs, based on information that they know in advance.
When few jobs are available, workers accept any job that comes along and are willing to
mismatch. When jobs are easy to ﬁnd, individual comparative advantages matter more, un-
employed workers search more selectively and mismatch less. Moreover, employed workers
search on the job more intensively to upgrade. An implication is that workers who change
occupation less frequently, because they have more specialized skills, are more sensitive to
business cycle conditions. We present the simplest version of the model that delivers this
prediction, and test this hypothesis explicitly. We consider the eﬀects of the unemployment
rate faced by each type of worker, which is an excellent proxy for his/her job-ﬁnding rate, on
the occupational mobility of diﬀerent groups of workers, who have diﬀerent transition rates
on average across business cycles.
Finally, the canonical job-matching theory (Jovanovic (1979)) of ex post worker sorting,
based on the success of the match that cannot be predicted without trying, implies that
“separation begets separation.” A displacement may force some workers to accept jobs in
new occupations, wasting some accumulated occupation-speciﬁc knowledge, and thus raise
expected subsequent separations and mobility. McCall (1990) ﬁnds supporting evidence of
this mechanism for occupations.5 Similarly, learning-by-doing on the job reduces the incen-
tives to job-to-job mobility over time (Pissarides 1994), and leads to a similar destruction of
speciﬁc capital upon a separation. Motivated by these hypotheses, we examine the presence
of persistence (dynamic eﬀects) in mobility.
To evaluate the contribution of these three factors, we specify a statistical model of
occupational mobility at the individual level that is directly motivated by the structural
equations of the theoretical model. Clearly, we face an endogeneity problem related to the
work decision. As the ideal data set, a long panel based on a large representative sample
and observed at high frequency, does not exist, we continue with the CPS. As this does not
provide us with a suﬃcient number of repeated observations on the same individuals, our key
identiﬁcation assumption is that the unobserved heterogeneity underlying the endogeneity
of worker characteristics, including employment status, is birth-cohort speciﬁc. This seems a
reasonable assumption, since individuals born at approximately the same point in time will
be subject to similar unobservable forces such as changing educational or training systems.
Accordingly, we construct a pseudo panel which allows us to control for these cohort level
5A similar mechanism is emphasized by Pries (2004) as a source of persistence of inﬂows into unemploy-
ment and of the unemployment rate itself.
4eﬀects with cohort dummies. This is eﬀectively equivalent to instrumenting all potentially
endogenous determinants of occupational mobility, such as education and marital status,
with a birth cohort dummy in the original, individual-level data set. Also, averaging across
individuals in the same cohort eliminates their individual unobserved heterogeneity. The
loss of sample size and within-cell sampling error are not major concerns in our data set,
which comprises over a million of month-individual observations. The size of our synthetic
panel is about the same, on either dimension, as that of standard individual-level panels,
such as the PSID or the NLSY, which suﬀer from much lower frequency of observation and
non-representative sampling.
The economic meaning of our identiﬁcation assumption and strategy is transparent.
While education and occupational mobility may be the result of unobservable worker pref-
erences −e.g., for risk and time−the changes in employment rates and in educational at-
tainments across birth cohorts are more plausibly due to other factors, related to economic
growth. Note that even if cohorts diﬀer in their average preferences for risk, time, education
and mobility, this can be captured by a cohort dummy. This strategy, proposed by Deaton
(1985), and extended by Verbeek and Vella (2005) to a dynamic setting, attains identiﬁca-
tion under our assumption provided that the covariates of interest are not linearly dependent
over time. This data requirement appears to be satisﬁed by our sample.
Our econometric investigation yields several new results. Occupational mobility declines
with age, family commitments (marital and head of household status) and education. All
these eﬀects are strong, both statistically and economically, and have a causal interpretation.
High unemployment weakens and can even reverse the negative eﬀect of college education
and marital status on career mobility. Indeed, the cross-sectional dispersion of regression
residuals, computed and plotted month by month, is strongly countercyclical, jumping sud-
denly by a factor of three in the severe 1981-1982 double recession, and by a factor of two in
the milder recessions of 1991 and 2001. This striking fact is consistent with the hypothesis
that worker sorting across occupations is noisier in recessions. As predicted by job-matching
theory, worker mobility has signiﬁcant residual persistence over time, unexplained by that
of employment composition and of unemployment. Finally, we detect important unobserved
cohort-speciﬁce ﬀects. In particular, later birth cohorts, except for the most recent that are
in the sample only early in their working lives, have increasingly low unexplained occupa-
tional mobility, which contributes considerably to the downward trend in total employment
reallocation over the period under examination.
Section 2 illustrates our theoretical framework, Section 3 presents our empirical model
and our estimation strategy, Section 4 describes the data and some relevant issues, Section
5 presents and discusses the results, Section 6 concludes.
52 A Frictional Roy Economy
Our empirical investigation is motivated by a view of the labor market as a search-frictional
Roy model, proposed by Moscarini (2001). Workers are endowed with ﬁxed occupation-
speciﬁc skills, which determine their comparative advantages. Given skill prices, workers
self-select across occupations. This sorting ﬁnds a partial impediment in search frictions,
which make it costly and time-consuming to ﬁnd a job both from unemployment and from
employment. When unemployment is higher, frictions bite more and individual comparative
advantages become less relevant in a worker’s occupational choice. This is the key prediction
of the model that we will test. We now present the simplest version of the model that
illustrates and formally delivers this prediction.
Time is discrete. The economy is inhabited by an unit measure of inﬁnitely-lived risk
neutral workers, who are endowed with a skill x ∈ [0,1] distributed according to a given skill
density g(x), symmetric around 1/2. Workers maximize expected wealth discounted with
factor  <1. When jobless, workers enjoy a ﬂow value of leisure b(x).
The economy has two occupations i =0 ,1. There is a continuum of ﬁrms of each type i,
ensuring free entry in both occupations. Firms and workers match 1:1. Output in occupation
i is pfi(x), where p is aggregate TFP, f0 is increasing, and f1(·)=1− f0(·), to capture the
idea that low x workers have a comparative advantage to work in occupation 0. Exogenous
idiosyncratic productivity shocks force the closure of active matches in each occupation i with
probability δ(x) > 0 each period. Unemployed workers of type x ﬁnd job oﬀers with chance
λ(x), a n de m p l o y e dw o r k e r sﬁnd outside oﬀers with chance ψ(x)λ(x). Search is costless.
Here δ(x), λ(x)a n dψ(x) are taken as given, but can easily be endogenized via ex post job
matching heterogeneity, a matching function, a vacancy ﬂow cost, and free entry. Both δ(x)
and ψ(x) can be occupation-dependent.
When contacting another ﬁrm, an employed worker triggers an ascending auction between
that ﬁrm and the current employer. In equilibrium under perfect information, no bidding
takes place as the weakly more productive ﬁrm can preempt the opponent. The worker
continues with the more productive of the two ﬁrms, and keeps bargaining on the wage. See
Moscarini (2001) for details.
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u(x).
The unemployed worker of type x enjoys a ﬂow value of leisure b(x), ﬁnds a job next period
with chance λ(x), in which case the job can be in either occupation with, due to the symmetry
6assumptions, equal chances. The value of employment in occupation i is V e
i (x). This solves
the Bellman equation V e
i (x)=m a xhWi (x),Vu(x)i where for i =0 ,1:
Wi(x)=wi(x)+δ(x)V








After receiving the wage wi(x), the worker may either be displaced, with chance δ(x), or








denote the indicator function of the worker’s willingness
to switch occupation should the opportunity arise. The Bellman equation of an operating
ﬁrm in occupation i employing worker x is maxhJi (x),0i where free entry yields a zero value
when vacant, and
Ji(x)=pfi(x) − wi(x)+( 1− δ(x))(1 − Ii(x)) Ji(x).
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Using this condition, we can solve for the wage wi(x) in each occupation as a function of the
values. Then, we place it in the Bellman equations and solve for the value functions.
Optimal search and separation behavior is easily described. Without search and matching
frictions, workers with skill x<1/2 would only accept jobs in occupation 0, and the others
only a job in occupation 1, breaking ties in favor of the latter. With frictions, assuming that
















such that the “specialists” who accept only jobs in one of the occupations are restricted to
the skill sets [0,1/2 − M] for occupation 0 and [1/2+M,1] for occupation 1, and symmet-
rically for occupation 1 (by symmetry, the value of M is the same in either case.) Workers
with intermediate skills (1/2 − M,1/2+M)d on o th a v es u ﬃciently strong comparative ad-
vantages to aﬀord rejecting any oﬀer. Of them, those with skills in (1/2 − M,1/2) and who
e n du pi no c c u p a t i o n1a r em i s m a t c h e d ,a st h ey could produce more in occupation 0, and
similarly for workers with skills in (1/2,1/2+M) who are employed in the other occupation.
So M is a measure of mismatch, which is in turn the engine of oﬀsetting worker ﬂows across
occupations.
7Flow balance equations determine the density of unemployed u(x) and employed g(x) −
u(x) workers by skill x. Clearly, for x in the region [0,1/2−M]
S
[1/2+M,1] where workers
search selectively only in one occupation, there are only exogenous separations and no ﬂows
to the other occupation. In the skill set (1/2 − M,1/2+M) of workers who accept both
kinds of jobs, there are also accessions from and separations to the other occupation, but in a
symmetric model in steady state they cancel out. So for all skill levels exogenous separations
(separation rate times employment) equal total hires from unemployment:
δ(x)[g(x) − u(x)] = λ(x)u(x)( 1 )
which can be solved for u(x).
How many of the employed in each occupation are mismatched? Inﬂow into the “wrong”
occupation can only occur from unemployment, as employed workers do not quit from a job
in the “wrong” direction, while the outﬂow can occur both to unemployment and through
an upgrading to the other occupation. By symmetry, there is an even chance that a received


















So the density of mismatched of skill x are a fraction [2 + ψ(x)λ(x)/δ(x)]
−1 < 1/2o ft h e
employed at skill x. This fraction decreases with the unemployment rate (as λ(x)/δ(x)
increases). The number of mismatched w o r k e r si st h u sc o u n t e r c y c l i c a l .
To derive testable implications, we focus on workers employed in consecutive periods.
The chance that a worker employed at times t and t+1 is observed in diﬀerent occupations
equals the chance of three mutually exclusive events: (i) he is in the mismatched set and
he is employed in the wrong occupation but ﬁnds a job in the other occupation without
experiencing unemployment, (ii) the same without any intervening unemployment, and (iii)
he is in the mismatched set, employed in the right type of job, loses his job, spends less than
one period unemployed, and ﬁnds another job, but this time in the wrong occupation. With
a slight abuse of notation, in order to be consistent with our monthly data set, we now allow
for time aggregation and the possibility that a worker loses a job and ﬁnds another one in
between periods. So:
Pr(employed at t and t+1, switches occupation ) =
½
Φ(x)f o r x ∈ (1/2 − M,1/2+M)


























Since occupational mobility rates are typically of the same order of magnitude as separa-
tion rates δ(x), few percentage points per month (see Figure 1,) while job-ﬁnding proba-
b i l i t i e sa tm o n t h l yf r e q u e n c ya r em u c hs m a l l e rt h a n1 ,i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tψ(x) >
δ(x)/[1 − δ(x)] ≈ δ(x).
Aggregate productivity aﬀects occupational mobility rates through two channels. First,
as p rises, the job ﬁnding rate λ(x)r i s e sa n dt h ej o bl o s i n gr a t eδ(x)f a l l s . T h i si sb o t h
empirically accurate and the generic implication of a model with free entry, a matching
function and endogenous separations. Thus, the unemployment rate declines. But ψ(x) >
δ(x)/[1 − δ(x)] implies that Φ(x) decreases in λ(x)/δ(x), or increases in the unemployment
rate, through the increases in the mass of mismatched workers for given M. Second, the
extent of mismatch M declines as p rises, because ideal jobs become easier to ﬁnd. So,
fewer workers switch occupation from job to job or through unemployment. Thus, if the
average occupational mobility rate is observed to co-move inversely with the unemployment
rate of that worker group, as we will ﬁnd in the data, it must be the case that this eﬀect
stems entirely from the intensive margin, Φ(x), the conditional chance of switching given
skills, because the set of skills that switches occupations (extensive margin) shrinks. In turn,
examining the expression for Φ(x), it decreases in λ(x)/δ(x). Hence, any positive eﬀect of
cyclical conditions on occupational mobility must stem entirely from an increase in λ(x)δ(x).
That is, the increase in the job-ﬁnding rate in an expansion must be proportionally larger
than the decrease in the job-losing rate, so that the increased availability of jobs in an
aggregate expansion more than makes up for the reduction in aggregate mismatch and raises
overall occupational mobility. It has indeed been recently documented (Shimer (2005)) that
job ﬁnding rates are substantially more volatile than separation rates into unemployment.
Workers with intermediate, non specialized skills are always willing to switch occupation;
specialized-skill workers are selective in their job search, especially in a tight labor market,
when their ”ideal” jobs abound. As a consequence, selective workers switch less on average
across the ups and downs of business cycles, but are also more cyclically sensitive. Of course,
in reality there are all sorts of temporary reasons aﬀecting occupational (non) mobility, such
as spousal relocation or occupation-speciﬁc demand shocks. So observed mobility is never
exactly zero for any type of worker, but decreases for selective workers when unemployment is
lower. This is the equilibrium prediction that we will test empirically: observable individual
9worker characteristics that predict occupational mobility, thus proxy for unobserved skills x,
have less explanatory power for mobility at times of high unemployment, when all workers
tend to become less discriminating independently of skill levels.
The challenge is to estimate consistently the causal eﬀects of various observable and unob-
servable worker characteristics x on mobility Φ(x), in a way that can be interacted with mea-
sures of labor market tightness, such as the unemployment rate. Several papers have analyzed
the eﬀects of unemployment on mismatch in a symmetric environment where every worker
is specialized in some occupation (Marimon and Zilibotti (1999), Barlevy (2002)). Formally,
skills and jobs are placed symmetrically on a circle. Our model (Moscarini 2001) diﬀer-
entiates between weak and strong comparative advantages, thus allows for cross-sectional
heterogeneity in mobility rates across workers, making this testable prediction meaningful.
3 An Empirical Model of Occupational Mobility
3.1 The Selection Problem
Consider a situation where we have T cross sections, comprising of Nt individuals at time








i,t is the latent variable capturing the individual i0s propensity to change job type
between times t and t+1;xi,t is a vector of individual explanatory variables, which may also
be interacted with aggregate variables; ϕ is the unknown parameter vector of interest; and
εi,t denotes some zero mean error term. The latent measure of mobility is not observed and
we conduct our empirical work with the observed measure
mobi,t =1 i f p e r s o n i in cross section t changes occupation between t and t +1









which says that the latent variable is above some minimum threshold mob, and mobi,t is
observed in the absence of any additional censoring mechanisms. Notice that the subindex
t on mob∗
i,t = 1 refers to the period preceding the decision to move. This empirical model
draws directly from our theoretical analysis, which justiﬁes specifying the mobility decision
as a function of worker characteristics and aggregate labor market conditions.
10A key issue is the treatment of joblessness. W ea r eo n l yi n t e r e s t e di nm o v e m e n t st oa
diﬀerent occupation, because this implies the skills of the individual are transferred to an ob-
servationally diﬀerent technology. When jobless, a worker has an “occupation” where he/she
produces either job search, or home goods, or leisure (or combination thereof). These activ-
ities are not easily quantiﬁable, and do not contribute to our measures of GDP and labor
productivity. In contrast, the occupations we focus on refer to formal employment. Thus,
we exclude joblessness from our occupations. This choice entails treating the individual par-
ticipation and mobility decisions separately. Another reason for excluding unemployment
from our “occupations” is that we are interested in cyclical patterns of reallocation. Since
unemployment is inherently countercyclical, its inclusion among our occupations would gen-
erate, in recessions, a burst of “reallocation” towards unemployment. Thus, we focus on the
eﬀects of business cycles on the career mobility of those who remain employed and the mo-
bility variable is only observed for the subsample reporting employment in two consecutive
months. Thus, we need to address the endogeneity of a worker’s employment status.





i,tα + νi,t > 0
ª
,t=1 ,2..T;i =1 ,2..Nt
where
bempi,t =1 i f p e r s o n i in cross section t is employed in both t and t +1
bempi,t =0 o t h e r w i s e .
and α is an unknown parameter vector. Next
mob1i,t = bempi,t · mobi,t (2)
where mob1i,t is the observed measure of mobility. To accommodate the possible endogeneity
of employment to mobility, and the consequent sample selection, one would typically assume
that the errors εi,t and the νi,t are correlated for each individual.
Failing to account for the process by which individuals are employed in consecutive peri-
ods, when estimating the mobility equations, might introduce a sample selection bias. That
is, the parameters that we estimate by examining only the sample for which bempi,t =1a r e
consistent for those individuals, but are generally inconsistent for the labor force comprising
bempi,t =0 . There are two solutions to this problem. The ﬁrst, while not totally satisfying,
is to acknowledge that the inferences that we draw from our empirical analysis is restricted
to those comprising the bempi,t = 1 population. The second approach is to employ some
estimation procedure which accounts for the selection process into the bempi,t =1s a m p l e .
11To do this one could adopt some form of control function procedure whereby the inclusion of
a constructed variable, typically relying on some distributional assumptions and/or exclusion
restriction, is able to restore the orthogonality conditions violated by the operation of the
selection process. Alternatively, one can make some assumptions about the process gener-
ating the errors in both the employment and mobility equations and exploit the assumed
structure. We adopt the latter approach. We aggregate the data and assume that those
within the same group, after the aggregation, have similar values for the common compo-
nents of εi,t and the νi,t. We then eliminate this common component, and that generating
the endogeneity, through appropriate data transformations.
3.2 The Identiﬁcation Strategy: Birth-Cohort Synthetic Panel
Our main empirical strategy tackles the problem of sorting and selection into employment
by means of a synthetic panel. For each year we combine individuals born in the same year,
and compute the average value of each variable of interest across those individuals. We then
construct a pseudo-panel comprising these averages for each cohort in each year.
More speciﬁcally, let c denote a birth cohort. Each year t we observe c =1 ,2...Ct cohorts




(#i : i ∈ c)
= Ei∈c [bempi,c,t]
denote the employment rate in consecutive periods t and t + 1 of the entire working age
sample of cohort c at that time t,a n d
mobc,t ≡
Σi∈cmobi,c,t
(#i : i ∈ c,bempi,c,t =1 )
= Ei∈c [mobi,c,t|bempi,c,t =1 ]
denote the average mobility between times t and t + 1 of the members of the cohort c who
are employed both at t and t + 1. Similarly, ¯ x0
c,t,¯ xbemp
c,t ,¯ εc,t, νc,t denote the cohort-wide
averages of (resp.) the characteristics of the sample, of the characteristics of the employed
(in consecutive periods), and of the error terms. Finally, let at be a vector of economy− or
labor market−wide aggregate factors that may aﬀect the individuals’ propensity to change
career of each worker. This might include, for example, monthly dummies to capture seasonal
eﬀects, or unemployment as a proxy for the state of the economy.










c,tθ + νc,t,t =1 ..T;c =1 ...C
12The two errors ¯ εc,t, νc,t are allowed to be correlated across cohorts. Without loss in
generality we can deﬁne each of the two random variables ¯ εc,t, νc,t to be the sum of a
common component and an orthogonal component, both random variables
¯ εc,t = ηc,t + ec,t
νc,t = ηc,t + nc,t
with cov(ec,t,n c,t)=cov(ηc,t,n c,t)=cov(ec,t,η c,t)=0a n dvar(ηc,t)=cov(¯ εc,t,νc,t). Our
identiﬁcation assumption is that the correlation embedded in ηc,t is time-invariant. That is,
it has to do exclusively with birth-cohort membership, while the time-varying components
of cohort-speciﬁc errors in employment and mobility are uncorrelated. Formally
Assumption 1 (Cohort-Based Identiﬁcation) The birth-cohort speciﬁc unobserved char-
acteristics that aﬀect both employment and career mobility outcomes are time-invariant.
¯ εc,t = ηc +¯ et
νc,t = ηc +¯ nt.






c,t β + CD
0
cω +¯ et (3)
by including cohort dummies CDc as additional regressors to account for, and estimate, the
ﬁxed eﬀects ηc. By controlling for the ﬁxed eﬀects we are able to consistently estimate β
under Assumption 1.
This estimation approach is a ﬁxed eﬀects procedures along the lines discussed by Deaton
(1985) and the procedure we adopt is similar to ﬁxed eﬀects estimation of the sample selection
model at the individual level. The conditions under which the model is consistent at the
individual level are discussed in Verbeek and Nijman (1992) and the assumptions that we
employ here are similar but at the cohort level. An advantage of this approach is that any
regressor which is endogenous, due to the presence of the cohort eﬀects, is made exogenous
via the inclusion of the cohort dummies.
In addition to assuming that the source of the endogeneity is birth cohort speciﬁca n dt i m e
invariant, we also require, for identiﬁcation of the parameters, that each of the explanatory
variables displays some linearly independent relationship with the birth cohort variable.
This means that the explanatory variables must vary with the birth cohort in a way which
is not fully predictable by the movement in the other variables. Figure 3 appears to provide
empirical support to this assumption. Historically, the proportion of College graduates rises
13over time, and across birth cohorts, presumably for aggregate growth reasons unrelated to the
average individual characteristics of the members of each cohort. Similarly, the proportion
of men who are married and/or heads of their households constantly declines across birth
cohorts. These trends do not appear to be linearly synchronized.
Ad i ﬀerent endogeneity problem arises when trying to quantify the trade-oﬀ between
individual and macroeconomic incentives to pursue diﬀerent careers. To this purpose, we
introduce among our controls the unemployment rate and its interactions with the cohort
characteristics. For example, if highly educated people switch careers less than average, their
relative (to other groups) mobility should be countercyclical, although overall mobility is pro-
cyclical. Ideally, we would like to employ group-speciﬁc unemployment rates, as workers of
diﬀerent education, marital and family status, and age typically face very diﬀerent labor
market conditions. So the unemployment rate would go in the ¯ xc,t vector of cohort charac-
teristics. These group-speciﬁcu n e m p l o y m e n tr a t e sux,t a r el i k e l yt ob ee n d o g e n o u st oc a r e e r
mobility: a shock to the propensity to change career is sure to generate some unemployment
from reallocation. Therefore, we instrument the group-speciﬁc unemployment rates with the
civilian, economy-wide male unemployment rate from the BLS. Speciﬁcally, we use the level
of the male civilian unemployment rate ut and its interaction with cohort characteristics as
instruments for the level of the cohort unemployment rates and its interactions. So ut and
xc,t · ut are instruments for each ux,t and xc,t · ux,t, x ∈ ¯ xc,t. Our maintained identiﬁcation
assumption, that we consider fairly plausible, is that any residual reverse causality from each
single group’s mobility to the US unemployment rate at large is absorbed by that group’s
cohort dummy.
To illustrate the economic meaning of our assumptions, consider the following example.
Suppose that individuals diﬀer by their unobserved level of risk aversion. Suppose further
that risk aversion determines three types of individual choices: whether to work or not
(formally, through vi,t), whether to change career or not (through εi,t), and whether to
acquire a College degree or not (through the observed level of education in xi,t). It is
plausible, in particular, that more risk averse individuals are more likely to work, less likely
to change career and to attain higher educational levels. Fuchs-Sch¨ undeln and Sch¨ undeln
(2005) provide strong evidence of unobserved worker characteristics that aﬀect both their
career choices and their precautionary saving behavior. This endogeneity creates an obvious
b i a si n ,s a y ,t h ee s t i m a t e de ﬀect of education on career mobility. We assume that the
average risk aversion of the individuals in each cohort c i si n v a r i a n to v e rt i m e ,a n dw e
absorb it into the ¯ ηc error, that can be dealt with by standard panel methods. In other
words, the correlation between employment and mobility due to unobservable individual
characteristics, such as risk or time preference, should be a much lesser concern across
14birth cohorts than across individual workers. Averaging across members of the same birth
cohort should eliminate most of the unobserved individual heterogeneity (see, for example,
Attanasio and Davis (1996),) and any residual eﬀect diﬀerentiating cohorts should then be
captured by the ﬁxed eﬀect ηc. We stress that both the sample selection into employment
and the endogeneity of some individual characteristics, such as education and marital status,
to mobility are problems that aﬀect any microeconometric study of worker turnover (see,
for example, Farber (1994).) In our approach, the residual diﬀerence in educational levels
across cohorts must be uniquely due to the fact that they were born at diﬀerent times. That
is, younger cohorts go to school longer because of such growth phenomena as income eﬀects
in education, exogenous to the cohort itself, and not because they like going to school better
than their parents. The same principle applies to the choice to get married and live with
the spouse, and to head the household.
3.3 Dynamics
Another advantage of the pseudo-panel approach is that it allows for the estimation of
dynamic eﬀects operating through the dependent variable. The job-matching theory of
worker turnover originating with Jovanovic (1979) emphasizes the accumulation of work
experience and learning speciﬁc to a job, which result in mobility declining with tenure.
The same mechanism applies to occupations, as corroborated by the evidence in McCall
(1990). An exogenous innovation in mobility above the predicted declining tenure/experience
proﬁle dissipates matching human capital, and leads workers to shop for new jobs for several
subsequent periods. Hence, we would expect innovations to mobility to persist.
The model we estimate




c,t β + CD
0
cω +¯ et (4)
is based on the approach of Verbeek and Vella (2005), who augment the static model (3)
with the lagged value for the cohort. They discuss the conditions for identiﬁcation and
consistency and they do not diﬀer greatly from the static model. However, it is necessary
that the lagged variable displays variation with cohorts which cannot be exactly replicated
by the variation in the cohort averages in the explanatory variables.
4 Data and Sample Disposition
Our data set includes 303 monthly cross-sections, from 1979:01 to 2004:03, of the US pop-
ulation contained in the monthly ﬁles of the Current Population Survey. We consider this
type of data set to be the most appropriate for our investigations, for three reasons. First,
15as our focus is macroeconomic we require a representative sample collected in a consistent
manner over a long period. The CPS is designed for this purpose and is the source for the
oﬃcial aggregate labor market statistics. Second, we attain identiﬁcation of the employment
decisions through the construction of a pseudo-panel by birth cohort. This would not be
feasible with other longitudinal surveys of workers, because it requires a very large sample
of individuals of the same age every month. Finally, the high (monthly) frequency of the
observations minimizes time aggregation (a worker may change occupation more than once
between interviews).
The monthly CPS is a rotating panel and we exploit this feature to construct our measure
of occupational mobility. We use cleaned measures of mobility from Moscarini and Thomsson
(2008). We refer to their paper for a discussion of issues relating to occupational classiﬁca-
tion, imputation, geographical attrition in the monthly CPS. The idea behind their cleaning
algorithm is to examine a worker’s career trajectory over his ﬁr s tf o u rc o n s e c u t i v em o n t h s
in sample, and to judge the plausibility of any occupational transition between months 2
and 3 in light of information on the months befor ea n da f t e r .I na d d i t i o n ,t h e ye x p l o i tt h e
increased reliability of CPS occupational measurement after 1994, when Dependent Coding
techniques were introduced to minimize spurious transitions, as well as additional features of
the job that are likely to be correlated with a genuine occupational change, such as changes
in class of worker (private, government, or self-employed) and in the three-digit industry
code, and active job search between interviews in months 2 and 3.6
Our sample comprises male civilian non-institutionalized adults of working age (16 to 64,
included) who are not in school or at home full time. We plan to consider female workers in
future research, but we exclude them for now because of the sharp transitional dynamics of
female participation over the 1979-2004 period under consideration.
We consider an individual i to be employed both this month t and the following month
t+1(andsetbempi,t = 1) if he reports to be either a salaried or a self-employed worker who
worked either full time full year or full time at least part of year. All of these workers have
a Census three-digit occupation in both months, and Moscarini and Thomsson (2008) show
how to purge transitions from imputation and measurement error. Among the employed,
we consider individual i a job mover if he reports at time t ad i ﬀerent occupation from next
month: mobi,t = I{occi,t 6= occi,t+1}. Although the persistence of half the sample across
months introduces correlation in errors, due to individual ﬁxed eﬀects, our birth-cohort
aggregation takes care of this problem.
6After 1994, Dependent Coding also allows to obtain an accurate measure of job-to-job transitions (see
Moscarini and Thomsson (2008)). Interestingly, over 1/3 of all occupational transitions after 1994 occur
without change of employer, most likely promotions or demotions.
16There exist an average of 453 occupational categories at the three-digit level, each contain-
ing an average 0.22% of employment. The largest category, “Sales Supervisors,” comprises
on average about 8% of employment. Some categories have empty cells in some months.
“Mathematical scientists” is a typical occupation that always comprises some individuals in
the sample every year, but averages less than one out of ten thousand workers.
Another important issue concerns measurement error in employment status. We do not
perform an Abowd-Zellner (1985)-type correction, because we consider only workers who
report being employed and a valid occupation for two consecutive months, who are very
unlikely to be unemployed workers misclassiﬁed as employed.
Measurement of education in the CPS is also problematic. In 1979-1991 the CPS ﬁles
contain the years of education of the individual, with an auxiliary dummy variable indicating
whether the highest grade attended was completed. Starting in 1992, the measurement of
educational levels becomes coarser. Frazis and Stewart (1999) discuss how to partially amend
the transition. Based on their results, and on a background check of our own, the only reliable
measure of education that we can consider consistent through the two subperiods (hence
through 1979-2004) is a pair of dummies, one indicating whether the individual achieved a
High School degree or got some College, the other whether he/she achieved a College degree
(BA or equivalent) or even had some graduate studies. Our check consists of measuring
the fractions of the active population who fall into each educational category and tracking
them over time. Any ﬁner classiﬁcation than the one we adopt (for example separating High
School graduates from those who also had some College) leads to a jump of these fractions
between 1991 and 1992, suggesting an inconsistency between classiﬁcations. The loss of
information caused by aggregating education at these three levels should not be too severe
if these educational attainment eﬀects can be captured by few dummies. Clearly this will
not be true if there is large variation within categories.
We consider yearly birth cohorts of men born between 1921 (who were 58 years old and
about to retire at the beginning of the sample in 1979) and 1985 (who were 19 years old in
the last year of the sample 2004), who are employed both in that calendar month and the
following one, so can generate an occupational transition. There are about a million of them
in the data set, on average about 4,000 per month, of which 81 in each birth cohort. To obtain
each observation, each month we average across all those individuals born in the same year.
Given the unbalanced nature of our pseudo panel we have a total of 13,565 observations,
still a very sizable panel despite the severe aggregation by birth cohort necessary to our
identiﬁcation strategy.














































































































































Figure 3: Other sample characteristics
18the period under consideration.7 These plots reveal some interesting trends. Average age
declined through the late 1970’s and then climbed back, as the aging baby-boomers claimed
an increasing share of the labor market. The proportion of whites and African-Americans
in total employment very slightly declined in favor of Hispanics and other ethnic groups,
a n dt h ep r o p o r t i o no fm e ni nt h es a m p l ew h ow e r em a r r i e dd e c r e a s e ds i g n i ﬁcantly. The
increasing educational levels of the US population are witnessed by the rise in the proportion
of High-School graduates, which ended in the mid-1990’s, and by the ongoing increase in the
proportion of College graduates and post-graduates.
5 Regression Speciﬁcations and Results
To estimate the synthetic cohort model (3) and explain the variation in career mobility, we
employ a 4th−order polynomial in age, and four dummies: married with spouse present, head
of household, High School graduate or some College, College (BA) graduate with or without
post-graduate studies. As mentioned, we include the cohort-speciﬁcu n e m p l o y m e n tr a t ea n d
its interaction with cohort characteristics, both instrumented with the corresponding terms
where the group-speciﬁc unemployment rate is replaced by the civilian unemployment rate.
The interactions are meant to capture the eﬀects of the job-ﬁn d i n gr a t eo ne xa n t es o r t i n g ,
as illustrated earlier and elaborated upon later in this section. We also experimented with
White ethnicity, African-American ethnicity, and War Veteran status. We do not present the
results because we do not have any prior about their theoretical and independent relevance
for career mobility, and because race composition of employment exhibits minor variations
over the period.
Three unfortunate lacunae of the CPS ﬁles for our purposes are measures of tenure on the
current job, work experience, and wage/earnings. Tenure is surveyed only every few years
in a Tenure Supplement. We do not proxy experience by age minus education, since age
and the educational dummies are among the explanatory variables. We choose to focus on
ﬂexible age eﬀects and interpret experience as being captured by age. This approach seems
less problematic for males than it would be for females. Usable wage/earnings information
is available only in the March Income Supplement.8
Table 1 presents the regression results, estimates and (in smaller font, beneath) t-ratios.
Estimates that are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level are in boldface. All speciﬁcations
7In a previous draft, based on annual (March) CPS ﬁles, we veriﬁed that these averages are identical in
trends but diﬀerent in levels for the labor force, whence including the unemployed. This is clearly suggestive
of some strong selection by employment status, that we address with our cohort-based strategy.
8The monthly ﬁles only contain wage information for the outgoing rotation groups (month in sample 4
and 8,) while the approach taken by Moscarini and Thomsson (2008) to obtain clean measures of career
mobility is based exclusively on individuals in months 2 and 3 of their rotation.
19Dependent variable: average occupational mobility of birth cohort c in calendar month t (mobc,t) in /100
OLS OLS IV OLS IV IV
 Constant 23.73182 30.26450 32.27710 29.06575 30.90179 56.73560
8.42438 9.67223 10.71234 9.25220 10.19941 15.73176
 Lagged mobility (mobc,t-1) 0.03382 0.03347 0.03242
4.01799 3.97425 3.73787
 Cohort Unempl. Rate (uc,t) -0.05414 -0.07081 -0.05271 -0.06784 -0.16709
-4.78038 -4.62610 -4.65463 -4.43010 -2.54490
 Age of the cohort (agec,t) -1.91353 -2.46553 -2.63560 -2.36060 -2.51578 -5.07949
-5.98409 -7.25706 -8.09817 -6.93153 -7.70383 -17.46119
 Age
2 0.06810 0.08599 0.09150 0.08235 0.08739 0.18285
5.87405 7.06346 7.80521 6.74989 7.43139 18.58899
 Age
3 -0.00108 -0.00134 -0.00142 -0.00128 -0.00135 -0.00288
-5.85726 -6.96723 -7.61973 -6.66383 -7.26344 -19.73583
 Age
4 6.33E-06 7.7E-06 8.1E-06 7.4E-06 7.7E-06 16.5E-06
5.83258 6.86920 7.44825 6.57613 7.10838 20.39509
 Head 0.00942 0.01000 0.01017 0.00928 0.00944 0.01311
2.58580 2.74371 2.79179 2.54383 2.58933 1.38454
 Head x uHead,c,t -0.00347
-1.11989
 Head total effect -0.00051
 ------
 Married -0.02039 -0.01922 -0.01886 -0.01854 -0.01822 -0.02505
-5.46656 -5.14539 -5.04873 -4.95947 -4.87436 -1.80881
 Married x uMarried,c,t 0.00432
1.12542
 Married total effect -0.00647
 ------
 High School 0.02017 0.02040 0.02047 0.01953 0.01960 0.03665
7.85288 7.94575 7.97414 7.58415 7.61324 3.36430
 High School x uHigh Sch,c,t -0.00140
-1.42770
 High School total effect 0.02828
 ------
 College 0.00678 0.00705 0.00713 0.00658 0.00666 -0.02501
1.48440 1.54415 1.56323 1.44149 1.45990 -4.54349
 College x uCollege,c,t 0.01596
4.19277
 College total effect 0.01398
 ------
 Number of observations 13,565 13,565 13,565 13,565 13,565 13,565
 Adjusted R
2
0.236 0.237  -- 0.238  --  --
In all specifications: 
 - numbers under estimated coefficients are correct t statistics; estimates in boldface are significant at 1% level
 - birth cohort and month of the year dummies included
In specifications estimated by IV:
 - unemployment rate of birth cohort c at time t (uc,t) instrumented with US civilian unemployment rate at t
 - group i total effect = i coefficient + i specific average unemployment rate (ui) * interaction coefficient (i x ui)
Table 1. Regression Results.
20include month and cohort dummies. “OLS” indicates speciﬁcations where the cohort/group
unemployment rate and its interaction with cohort characteristics are either absent or in-
troduced as covariates. “IV” refers to the speciﬁcations where they are introduced but
instrumented with the civilian unemployment rate. Note that the estimates account for the
diﬀerent cell sizes via a weighted least squares procedure. Moreover, the standard errors in
the IV speciﬁcations are appropriately corrected for these diﬀerent cell sizes.
Our empirical strategy is the following. Initially we explore the relationship between
worker characteristics and the probability of an occupational transition. This is reported in
the ﬁrst column of Table 1. Then we introduce the cohort’s unemployment rate, we instru-
ment it with the civilian unemployment rate, then we add the lagged dependent variable,
with and without unemployment instruments, and ﬁnally we interact the group-speciﬁcu n -
employment rates with the cohort characteristics in the IV approach. This ﬁnal column
represents our chosen speciﬁcation and we present the other estimates so that the reader
can gauge the degree of sensitivity across speciﬁcations. The discussion that follows is pri-
marily based on the estimates from the last column. Notice that due to the interaction of
the unemployment rates with group characteristics it is necessary to assess the eﬀects of
both the direct group eﬀect and that operating through the interaction terms. The “total
eﬀect” of characteristic x is obtained by summing the estimate of the direct eﬀect ϕx and
the product between the interaction coeﬃc i e n ta n dt h es a m p l em e a no v e rt i m eo ft h a tx
group’s unemployment rate ux,t. This, however, has no implications for the lagged mobility
and age eﬀects.
Worker Characteristics. As expected, age has a negative and diminishing impact on
career mobility. This eﬀect is quite strong and robust across all speciﬁcations. For the
1960 cohort, at age 16 the probability of a change in occupation is 28 percent although
this decreases at the sample mean to approximately 8 percent in 15 years. The age eﬀect
then slowly decreases to approximately 4 percent at which point it appears to level out. We
interpret this negative eﬀect as “occupational matching” stemming from work experience.
By trying diﬀerent occupations, the worker learns which occupations are most suitable to
his talents. The age eﬀects may also capture the eﬀects of accumulated occupation speciﬁc
human capital acquired while on the job. This eﬀect is consistent with the evidence presented
by McCall (1990) and Neal (1998). The former shows that the retention rate of a worker
on a new job is signiﬁcantly higher if the occupation is the same as in the previous job.
The latter documents that young workers follow a two-stage search strategy, ﬁrst shopping
for a career, and then for an employer within the chosen career. As a consequence of both
mechanisms, career mobility should decrease with age.
21Heading the household causes a 1% increase in the man’s career mobility, a quite large
eﬀe c t .R o u g h l yd o u b l ei na b s o l u t ev a l u ei st h en e g a t i v ee ﬀect of being married with spouse
present. We interpret these ﬁndings as saying that male heads need to work to support
their families, thus are more prone to change career to remain employed, while married
men with spouse present are less likely to switch, because of the mobility cost associated
to the spousal job. Notice, however, that both eﬀects are signiﬁcantly weakened, and lose
statistical signiﬁcance, when interacted with the unemployment rates of heads and married
men, appropriately instrumented.
Very strong support in favor of cyclical worker sorting is the eﬀect of education on mobil-
ity. This support emerges from the comparison between high school and college graduates,
who make up most of the sample. In our preferred speciﬁcation, shown in the last column,
the estimates indicate college graduates change careers slightly more often than high school
dropouts, but signiﬁcantly less than high school graduates. The latter appear to be less
committed to a speciﬁc occupation and appear more willing to switch occupations irrespec-
tive of cyclical factors. In contrast, college graduates stay where they are in tight labor
markets, and move around much more when many of them are unemployed. Notice that the
interaction term for college graduates not only has a strong and very signiﬁcant eﬀect, but
also changes the baseline estimate of the college eﬀect.
In terms of Moscarini (2001)’s sorting theory, college graduates are “specialized” work-
ers, as they respond more to changes in their own jobless rate. Recall that the exogenous
eﬀect of education on career mobility is identiﬁed by comparing birth cohorts with diﬀerent
educational levels. This ﬁnding, which is one of our main contributions, stands in contrast
to the oft-cited but hardly corroborated claim that college education provides mostly general
human capital. While college education certainly does provide general skills, it appears that
it induces its recipients to change career relatively less when jobs are plentiful and when
overall occupational mobility is higher.
Finally, we note that these estimates only capture the eﬀects of the quantity of education.
Changes in the quality of education over the decades are cohort-speciﬁca n ds h o u l dt h e nb e
reﬂected in the estimated cohort eﬀects.
Unemployment. We envision various sources of macroeconomic shocks that aﬀect total
occupational mobility: aggregate shocks to labor demand, such as shocks to TFP, prefer-
ences for leisure, or monetary policy. While measuring macroeconomic shocks is notoriously
diﬃcult, we choose to proxy them with the unemployment rate of the group-cohort, appro-
priately instrumented by the civilian unemployment rate measured as the yearly average
of the monthly male unemployment rates published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. In
22our view, it is labor market tightness, not GDP growth per se, that drives workers’ career
choices. Since vacancies and unemployment are almost perfectly inversely correlated at cycli-
cal frequencies (see Shimer 2005), but lag the cycle, the unemployment rate appears to be
an appropriate proxy for labor market tightness. We cannot identify business cycle eﬀects
through time dummies, due to the presence of the age and birth cohort eﬀects. We assume
there are no direct time eﬀects beyond those captured by them a c r o e c o n o m i cv a r i a b l e s .
A cohort’s unemployment rate, instrumented by the economy-wide rate, has a negative
association with mobility. The direct eﬀect is quantitatively strong, especially when we
include the interaction terms involving education, and always statistically signiﬁcant at the 1
percent level. This substantive result is also consistent with previous raw correlations found
in sectorial mobility by Murphy and Topel (1987) and by Jovanovic and Moﬃtt (1990),
although these authors only condition on worker age and do not address the endogeneity
of unemployment to mobility. The existing literature has focused more on employment
reallocation over business cycles across industries, rather than across occupations. The
stylized fact is the “Cyclical Upgrading of Labor”: workers move to high-wage, cyclical
industries in expansions and vice versa (see McLaughlin and Bils (2001).) However, this
phenomenon predicts a correlation between unemployment and net ﬂows. Even assuming
that a similar phenomenon exists for occupations, this still fails to account for the negative
association of unemployment with the size of the gross ﬂows that we ﬁnd.
Dynamics. A main advantage of the pseudo-panel is the possibility of estimating consis-
tently a dynamic eﬀect in the dependent variable. In our case of occupational mobility, the
economic reason to expect such a residual persistence is the presence of an occupational-
matching component in productivity. Suppose that an occupation-speciﬁcs h o c kd i s p l a c e s
many workers from their career, and forces them to search for a new one. Then as the
re-learning process takes time, we would expect those of them who are less lucky to keep
changing occupation even a year later, independently of any other observable event or indi-
vidual characteristics.
Our estimates of the lagged eﬀects are precise and stable across speciﬁcations. Given that
the model is a linear regression the interpretation is straightforward. That is, suppose that
in going from month t to t+1 we observe 100 individuals change occupations. The estimate
implies that in going from t +1t ot +2 , more than three of these individuals will change
occupation again in the next month. Thus, even in a state where the other explanatory
variables are combining in a manner to produce no additional reallocation we can see that
there remains a signiﬁcant degree of mobility. Note that these are job changers and not
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Figure 5: Monthly dummy estimates and 99% conﬁdence intervals.
occupation in one period will continue to do so in subsequent periods. These estimates point
to an important eﬀect of propagation of any shock to the economy which aﬀects occupational
mobility, with all of the obvious implications for aggregate productivity and welfare. This
appears to be the ﬁrst evidence which substantiates the presence of this dynamic eﬀect, in
addition to exploring its magnitude.
Seasonal Eﬀects. We now comment on the estimates of the monthly dummies, noting
that January is the excluded month, reported with 1% conﬁdence bands in Figure 5. As
expected, there are spikes in mobility in May (between May and June), when schools close,
and in August (between August and September), when they re-open. After that, the Fall is
a season of below-average career mobility.
Birth Cohort Eﬀects. We now comment on the pattern of the estimated cohort dummy
coeﬃcients, excluding 1921. Given the large number of estimates we report them by plotting
them in Figure 6 for the last speciﬁcation (column) in Table 1, as a time series with their
1% conﬁdence bands.
The results are striking and several of their features merit comment. First, the range in
the cohort eﬀects is large suggesting that a lot of the variation in mobility rates across cohorts


































Figure 6: Birth cohort dummy estimates and 99% conﬁdence intervals
equation. Second, in our preferred, latter speciﬁcations the estimates of the cohort eﬀects
are typically and signiﬁcantly declining over time, suggesting that later cohorts (starting
from those born in the mid-1930’s) have an unexplained and statistically signiﬁcantly lower
propensity to change occupation. This eﬀect begins to vanish and reverse course with the
cohorts born in the 1960s, and is almost entirely undone by an increase in unexplained
mobility by workers born in the late 1970s and 1980s, who appear to be as ﬂexible and
mobile as their grandparents born in the 1920s and 1930s. These eﬀects cannot be due to
age diﬀerences, because we do control for ageing in a quite ﬂexible manner, and because age
eﬀects are typically monotonic. It is also unlikely that they are due to composition eﬀects
of diﬀerent cohorts, because we do control for several of these characteristics that we would
expect to aﬀect career mobility.
At this stage, we can only speculate about the interpretation of this generational pattern.
Younger generations seem to be more ﬂexible than their parents, but no more than their
grandparents. We can only speculate that this is due to the increasing specialization required
of workers after WWII, with the latest cohorts reacting to increasing turbulence in the US





































Figure 7: Regression residuals, last column of Table 1
Discussion. In the light of our ﬁndings concerning the long-run changes in the composition
of employment in terms of various characteristics (Figures 2 and 3), and their causal eﬀects on
career mobility (Table 1), we now attempt to explain the trend and cycle in total employment
reallocation across occupations (Figure 1).
Figure 7 illustrates the time series of the regression residuals from the last speciﬁcation
in Table 1. While the residuals look “white,” some of the late decline in mobility after the
2001 recession remains unexplained. Other than that, the pronounced movements at cyclical
frequencies appear to be well captured by the unemployment rate, including its indirect eﬀect
on the propensity to change career of diﬀerently educated workers. Some eﬀects stem also
from the cyclical composition of employment.
The average age of the US population reached a minimum in the mid-1970’s, correspond-
ing to the peak of the baby boom, to then steadily increase subsequently. Therefore, younger
cohorts are relatively less important in size, and contribute less to raise overall mobility. This
may explain the mild negative trend in occupational mobility documented in Figure 1 post
1980s.
The estimated interaction terms tend to be always of the opposite sign of the direct
impact estimate. This suggests that individual characteristics that are useful to predict
career mobility become less useful for doing so in times of high unemployment. To verify
this conjecture, in Figure 8 we plot the 9-month rolling standard deviation of regression































Figure 8: Rolling standard deviation of regression residuals, 9-month window
1990 and 2001. Since the series is constructed by a two-sided 9-month window, including
four months forward, it tends to lead the cycle. This is the strongest evidence in favor of
our prediction. At times of high unemployment, workers scramble to ﬁnd any kind of job,
and it becomes harder to predict how frequently they will change career just based on their
characteristics. Interestingly, we also observe an increased “turbulence” in the mid-1990s,
when the US economy experienced a temporary slowdown after the Mexican crisis of 1994,
although not technically a recession.
Regarding our ﬁndings on the cohort eﬀects, we propose two interpretations. One is in
terms of the quality of human capital. Card and Lemieux (2001) ﬁnd a break in the returns
to education for cohorts born since the mid 1950’s. Their interpretation is that the slowdown
in the growth of educational attainments generated a skill shortage relative to a “balanced
growth” allocation and raised the College premium for these young workers. This may be
explained by their rising career mobility. Gosling, Machin and Meghir (2000) also provide
a cohort-based interpretation of the rise in men’s wage inequality in the United Kingdom
since the late 1970’s, when the cohorts born in the mid 1950’s started to appear on the labor
market. They argue that educated workers in these later cohorts received a diﬀerent quality
of human capital in school and College.
The second interpretation that we oﬀer is that the “corporate culture” in the US has
changed across generations, shifting emphasis away from lifetime loyalty to the same em-
ployer and towards “loyalty to an occupation,” independently of the employer. Using the
27same data set and roughly the same period, Stewart (2002) documents a rise in job-to-job
transitions (namely those with less than two weeks of intervening unemployment), lending
some support to this second hypothesis.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we formulate and test the hypothesis that workers are more prone to mismatch
in a depressed labor market. In a large, representative, long and high-frequency data set, we
study career mobility, that we let depend on worker individual characteristics, both observed
and unobserved. The latter are assumed to depend only on the birth year of the worker,
to capture such cohort eﬀects as cultural background, quality of education, and parental
experience. We show that occupational mobility declines with age, family commitments, and
education. These eﬀects, though, tend to be reversed when the worker’s peers experience
high unemployment. In addition, the predictive power of individual and aggregate eﬀects
declines when unemployment is high in the US economy. We conclude that worker sorting
across occupations, likely the most important type of employment reallocation, occurs more
randomly in a loose labor market.
We see this paper as the ﬁrst of several steps to further inquire into the nature of cyclical
mismatch, as well as into the meaning of the strong cohort eﬀects in career mobility that
we ﬁnd. The next steps will exploit information about earnings and hourly wages, which is
available in the same data set that we use, the monthly CPS, albeit only for a fraction of
the sample, the outgoing rotation groups. Whatever the conclusions that we can draw from
wage information, we have established strong evidence that diﬀerent workers tend to behave
more similarly in a depressed labor markets. In tight labor markets, conversely, individual
heterogeneity emerges as the primary and strong driving force of career mobility decisions.
Coupled with the well known and studied eﬀects of reallocation on unemployment (Lilien
(1982)), the reverse eﬀect of unemployment on worker mobility that we uncover suggests
a complex dynamic inter-relationship between a g g r e g a t ee c o n o m i ca c t i v i t ya n dt h ep a c eo f
factor reallocation. Future research must take this two-way relationship into consideration
when studying the determinants of productivity growth.
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